Conflict Resolution for Moldova and Transdniestria through Federalisation? CEPS Policy Brief No. 25, August 2002 by Coppieters, Bruno & Emerson, Michael.
CENTRE FOR
EUROPEAN
POLICY
STUDIES
CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 25
AUGUST 2002
CONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR MOLDOVA AND
TRANSDNIESTRIA THROUGH FEDERALISATION?
BRUNO COPPIETERS
AND
MICHAEL EMERSON
CEPS Policy Brief are published to provide concise policy-oriented analysis of
contemporary issues in EU affairs. Unless otherwise indicated, the views
expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal capacity and not to
any institution with which they are associated.
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.be)
￿ Copyright 2002, Bruno Coppieters and Michael Emerson1
CONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR MOLDOVA AND
TRANSDNIESTRIA THROUGH FEDERALISATION?
CEPS POLICY BRIEF NO. 25
BRUNO COPPIETERS AND MICHAEL EMERSON
*
The present note is a response to the invitation from Moldova to comment on the
new draft agreement proposed by Russia, Ukraine and the OSCE to resolve the
decade-old stand-off between Moldova and  Transdniestria, following the
conflict over the latter’s attempted secession in 1992. It is a contribution to an
open international debate over the search for a viable solution.
Summary
At a meeting in Kiev on 1-3 July 2002, the mediators for the  Moldovan-
Transdniestria conflict proposed, at the initiative of the OSCE, a draft agreement
on the constitutional system that would regulate the distribution of competencies
between Chisinau and Tiraspol. This draft agreement defines the Republic of
Moldova as a “federal state”. The implementation of the agreement would be
monitored and ultimately guaranteed by the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the
OSCE.
1
It is to be greatly welcomed that the interested parties have reached the stage of
negotiation over a full text to finally resolve a conflict in a constitutionally
ordered way. It is also notable, and highly positive, that this process is now
being made open and transparent. This improves the chances that the outcome
will be viewed as democratically legitimate by the population, which is an
important condition for its long-term viability. Under the present circumstances,
the choice of a federal solution should also be welcomed as the best option for a
multi-national state such as Moldova. Furthermore, the federalisation of
Moldova could lead to a positive spillover effect in the frozen conflicts of the
southern Caucasus.
                                                
* Bruno Coppieters is Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science of
the Vrije  Universiteit  Brussel (VUB). Michael Emerson is Senior Research Fellow at the
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), Brussels. Thanks to Nathalie Tocci and Elena
Prokhorova for valuable contributions. The authors would welcome comments by email
(Bruno.Coppieters@vub.ac.be and Michael.Emerson@ceps.be).
1 For an in-depth analysis of this draft agreement see Vladimir  Socor, ‘ Federalization
Experiment in Moldova’,  Russia and Eurasia Review, Vol. 1, Issue 4, 16 July 2002,
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To what degree is the proposed constitutional arrangement likely to solve
conflicts of competencies between the federal government and the government
of Transdniestria and to provide for federal stability? This question cannot yet
be answered positively, since there are some weaknesses in the draft agreement
which need further attention. These are:
1.  It is not clear how many subjects of the federation there would be: two (with
just  Transdniestria), three (with  Gagauzia), or more? The answer makes a
difference to what kind of federation Moldova should become, and notably
symmetric or asymmetric.
2.  There is an excessively long list of joint competencies, which makes future
conflicts over competencies all too likely. Working with exclusive
competencies would be a better choice.
3.  According to the draft agreement, conflicts are primarily due to be settled by
the authority of the federal level. Such an hierarchical principle is
inappropriate to resolve conflicts between levels of governance that represent
different national communities.
4.  The role of the Presidency needs further consideration, the present proposal
being overloaded with both executive and arbitrating responsibilities.
5.  There is room for considering electoral methods for the parliament and
presidency that would favour candidates that can mobilise support among the
different ethnic communities.
6.  There are no political and juridical mechanisms (such as a constitutional
court) for conflict mediation or resolution in case of disputes. Existing ethno-
federations provides for a whole range of constitutional mechanisms
appropriate to preserve federal stability.
7.  There is no mechanism for constitutional revision.
8.  The list of ‘guarantees’ is excessively long and implausible in some cases.
9.  The mechanism for how the three guarantors would work, and the nature of
their authority needs to be specified. In particular there are some interesting
possibilities for internalising the role of the guarantor and/or arbitrator, based
on experiences of the OSCE and Council of Europe elsewhere.
Choice of a federal system
Federalism is dealing with the division of power between levels of governance.
In a federation, the fields of government are vertically divided between a federal
level and at least two federated entities. The federal and the federated level areCONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR MOLDOVA AND TRANSDNIESTRIA THROUGH FEDERALISATION?
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drawing their competencies directly from the constitution.
2 In this respect, a
federation differs from a confederation, where the division of power is
horizontally organised on the basis of the sovereignty of the constituent parts,
and it also differs from a  regionalised or decentralised system, where the
division of power is only weakly developed. In a regionalised or decentralised
state, the distribution of competencies may be unilaterally modified by the
central level, without any kind of involvement of the regions. The mediators to
the conflict on Transdniestria have clearly opted for a federation. According to
Art. 1 of the draft constitution, the “Republic of Moldova is a democratic,
federal State”. This means that the division of power has to be regulated by
constitutional procedures.
Ethno-federations and territorial federations
The building-blocks of  ethno-federations are constituted by national
communities, as a way to acknowledge the separate identity of various national
identities in a single state.
3 Such an arrangement differs from a territorial
arrangement.
4 A territorial type of federation does not take minority and other
collective rights into account in drawing the borders between federated entities
or in the distribution of competencies. The draft agreement includes  ethno-
federal principles in the regulation of the use of language. According to Art. 14,
a distinction is made between  Moldovan as a “national language” and the
languages of the state-territorial entities, that may be used on their territory as
“official languages”. However, the number of federated entities– described as
‘state-territorial entities’ in the draft agreement – is not specified. It clearly
includes Transdniestria. But would it also make special provision for Gagauzia,
which presently has an autonomy arrangement? And for  Taraclia county, with
its Bulgarian population?
This lack of specification leaves the door open in theory to a mixed type of
federation. The Moldovan federation might in this case include some federated
units based on the principle of ethnicity, and some federated units based on the
territorial principle, whose boundaries are not linked to ethnicity. The choice
                                                
2 On these definitions see Bruno  Coppieters,  Federalism and Conflict in the Caucasus,
London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001, pp. 6-7.
3 The various ‘national’ communities do not necessarily constitute the majority of these
entities, as demonstrated by the Soviet federal example, where some of the nations constituted
a minority in ‘their’ Union or Autonomous republic.
4 On ethno-federal and territorial types of federal arrangements see Bruno Coppieters, ‘Ethno-
Federalism and Civic State-Building Policies: Perspectives on the Georgian-Abkhaz
Conflict’, in  Regional and Federal Studies, Vol. 11, No 2, pp. 74-75. Concerning the
delimitation of borders between the federated units, the draft provides for a certain flexibility.
According to Art. 13 of the draft agreement, “the borders of the state-territorial entities of the
Republic of Moldova may be changed by their consent and that of the Republic of Moldova”.BRUNO COPPIETERS AND MICHAEL EMERSON
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over the nature of the federated entities is closely linked to the choice over a
symmetric or asymmetric  division of competencies. A symmetric distribution of
powers (i.e. all federated entities have the same powers) tends to prevail in
territorial federations such as Germany or the US. Symmetry may also exist in
ethno-federations, as possibly in Cyprus if the current negotiations over a
settlement succeed. In mixed federations, an asymmetric distribution of
competencies is more common. In the case of Spain, for instance, Catalonia and
the Basque Country have different competencies, in accordance with their
particular historical traditions and political needs. For this reason also, the
Georgian government has envisaged an asymmetric distribution of competencies
in a future federal state that would include Adjaria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Contrary to asymmetric federal designs symmetric types of power distribution
are far more rigid in handling specific claims of national minorities.
The number of federated entities is also an important factor affecting the choice
of symmetry versus asymmetry. According to comparative federal theory, a
larger number of federated entities permits a more complex game of political
alliances in a federation, which should favour compromises and stability. In the
case of Moldova, where the largest national community will be dominant in any
case, a multiplication of federal actors would not necessarily facilitate the
integration of national minorities into the federation. This is particularly the case
when the federal constitution prescribes a symmetric distribution of power.
Symmetry may lead to more risks of conflict if the number of federated entities
representing one single nationality increases. Moreover, it remains to be seen to
what extent the limited size and population of Moldova would permit such a
multiplication of federal entities. If the federated entities only included
Transdniestria and Gagauzia and not other territorial regions of Moldova, the
risk that a symmetric system would be de-stabilising would be lower.
Nonetheless, even if the number of federated entities were kept low, it seems
preferable to choose the more flexible type of an asymmetric federation.
Excessive mixed competencies
A serious risk for future conflicts between the Republic of Moldova and
Transdniestria lies in the very large number of mixed competencies given to the
federal and federated levels. These include (according to Article 16) the
protection of individual rights; issues of property; management of land, earth,
water, and other natural resources; education, science, culture and sports; social
security; and principles of taxation.
5 It will be difficult for the legislators at the
                                                
5 There is no clear delimitation between article 15 that defines the competencies of the federal
level and article 16 that defines the joint competencies. According to article 15, for instance,
the federal level has the competence to “establish the fundamentals of policy and programs in
the areas of State, economic, ecological, social, cultural, and national development of the
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various levels of government and for the administrations to delimit the scope of
their own powers. Conflicts of competencies will unavoidably be politicised and
easily escalate, threatening the unity of the federation.
The draft agreement provides that in case of conflicts between legislative levels
the primacy of the federal level should be respected (Article 20). The
implementation of such a hierarchical principle is not able, however, to solve
political conflicts in the long term. Such a procedure will not be perceived by
national minorities in Moldova as corresponding to democratic and federal
principles, but as the expression of hierarchical relations between nations, where
the majority principle dominates the right to internal self-determination of
minority groups. This will undermine the legitimacy of a federal solution to the
ethnic divisions, strengthen the secessionist potential in  Transdniestria, and
necessitate the permanent involvement of the external guarantors in the political
decision-making on all levels of the federation.
It would be a far wiser option to reduce the number of shared competencies (and
framework competencies) to the absolutely necessary minimum, and to make
use instead of a model of distribution of powers based on exclusive
competencies for each level of governance. As each level is drawing its powers
directly from the constitution, such an option makes it possible to minimalise the
hierarchical principle between national communities. It also  minimalises the
points of friction between governments, parliaments and administrations. And
where competencies have to be shared, they can to a certain extent be
subdivided in narrower sub-competencies and allocated exclusively to one level
of government.
Role of the Presidency
The presidential institution, as designed by the draft proposal (Arts. 23 to 25) is
a further factor that may make the integration of the various entities composing
the federation more difficult. According to the draft proposal, the President, as
Head of State, determines the main directions of domestic and foreign policies.
He has to be elected at a joint session of both Chambers of the Parliament. He
has a determining role in utilising “agreed procedures for resolving
disagreements between organs of State authority of the Republic of Moldova
and organs of State authority of the state-territorial entities” (Art. 24). In case no
                                                                                                                                                        
whose principles are designed on the federal level may lead to conflictual interpretations. It is
further unclear how to differentiate article 15 from article 16 in these various fields of
governance without creating numerous points of friction. Article 15 is stating among others
the exclusive right of the federal level to develop the “fundamentals of policy and programs’
in the areas of State, economic, ecological, social, cultural, and national development of the
Republic of Moldova, whereas article 16 is stating that most of these policy fields are a matter
of joint competence in their implementation.BRUNO COPPIETERS AND MICHAEL EMERSON
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agreement is achieved, he may forward the case to “an appropriate court”. The
composition of this court is not further specified.
In the case of the ethno-federal arrangements to be found in Spain, Belgium or
Bosnia, stability is partly achieved by severe limitations on the role of the Head
of State. This is done by adopting the principles of a constitutional monarchy
and of a parliamentary democracy (Spain and Belgium), or of a rotating
Presidency (Bosnia). According to the draft proposal for Moldova, to the
contrary, the President has two contradictory roles. He is both the dominating
figure in the executive branch and he has an arbitrating role, in case a conflict
would arise between the various levels of government. This means that the
President would be the main federal actor in all conflicts arising with federated
states and its main arbitrator.
It may be necessary to redefine the role of the Presidency, first of all by
increasing the role of other state institutions in mediating and resolving political
disputes. While there is no agreement between scholars to which extent the
conflict in Transdniestria may be considered as an ethnic conflict,
6 it is obvious
that the constitution should give a maximum number of guarantees that the
Presidency is not perceived as defending the sole interests of one ethnic
community. Specific institutional provisions should prescribe a neutral role of
the Head of State in ethnic disputes. The draft agreement for Moldova does not
provide for such guarantees.
Electoral methods
The election of the president at a joint session of both Chambers of the
Parliament does not exclude the election of a political figure that might not have
a political interest in playing a moderating role in ethnic conflicts. There are no
provisions in this draft either for electoral techniques that would favour the
election of moderate figures in both chambers of Parliament. ‘Moderate’
political behaviour on the part of parliamentarians and the President may be
                                                
6 According to Steven D. Roper, “the linguistic concerns of the  Russophone population of
Transdniestria were a salient factor underlying the outbreak of conflict”, but the “pragmatic
considerations of the regional elite make this conflict a regional rather than an ethnic issue.”
See Steven D. Roper, Regionalism in Moldova: The Case of  Transdneistria and  Gagauzia,
Regional & Federal Studies, Vol. 11, No 3. According to  Gottfried  Hanne, this conflict,
“despite being known as the Transdniester conflict (…) is not so much regional as rather of an
ideological, power-political, economic and in part ethnic nature.  Gottfried  Hanne,  Der
Transdnistrien-Konflikt:  Ursachen,  Entwicklungsbedingungen  und  Perspektiven  einer
Regulierung, The Transdniester Conflict: Origins, Determinant Conditions and Prospects of
Settlement, Bericht des Bundesinstituts für Internationale und Ostwissenschaftliche Studien,
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achieved, for instance, by electoral techniques that favour candidates who can
attract a minimum number of votes among the different national communities.
7
Provisions for revision
In a federation, constitutional changes in the distribution of power cannot be
made without the participation of both levels of governance or of the various
national communities that constitute the federation. The draft agreement
provides for  guarantees for the preservation of the agreed distribution of power.
According to Art. 8, the distribution of competencies in the federation is
regulated by “the present Agreement, the Constitution and the laws of the
Republic of Moldova, other agreements on delimitation of competencies and
powers”. No provisions are made, however, concerning the procedures to be
followed in case the distribution of competencies has to be changed. In this
respect, it will be difficult to correct in-built defects of the constitutional set-up
in a later stage. This is no good omen for stability, taking into consideration that
other  ethno-federations, such as Belgium or Spain, seem to require recurrent
constitutional reforms in order to adapt the institutional framework to changing
realities and compromise agreements.
Constitutional court
The present draft agreement does not provide for appropriate political and
juridical institutions that would be able to manage conflicts of competencies
between the levels of the federation. A constitutional court is a good alternative,
assuming it is able to solve the problem of the ethnic affiliation of the judges,
which might otherwise weaken the legitimacy of its rulings.
8 A solution has
been found for Bosnia and Herzegovina, where some of the judges of the
constitutional court are appointed by the President of the European Court of
Human Rights (which is linked to the Council of Europe).
External guarantors
The role of the three guarantors, the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the OSCE,
and the nature of the guarantees, need further specification. We have no
comment ourselves on who the guarantors should be, since this would be the
                                                
7 On this issue see the writings of Donald Horowitz.
8 One of the failings of the 1960 arrangement for Cyprus was precisely linked to the
functioning of the Supreme Constitutional Court. The Court was composed of three Judges:
one Greek Cypriot, one Turkish Cypriot and a neutral President. The President of the court
was Prof. Ernest Forsthoff from Heidelberg, chosen jointly by the Greek Cypriot Republic’s
President and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-President. This was not sufficient to guarantee the
Court’s impartiality, because both Cypriot judges became soon public advocates for their
community’s positions. See Thomas Ehrlich, Cyprus 1958-1967, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1974, pp. 41-45.BRUNO COPPIETERS AND MICHAEL EMERSON
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political choice of the principal parties. However their role certainly requires
clarification in several respects.
First, it needs to be clarified whether the three guarantors are authorised to act
individually or only jointly. We may mention the example of Cyprus, where
Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom are guarantors. In this case the
procedures to guarantee domestic peace and the rules of intervention were
insufficiently specified in 1960.
9 This was one of the factors explaining the civil
war and the ensuing Turkish intervention, leading to the division of the island.
The same defect should not be repeated in Moldova, where it still has to be
made clear which model, of individual or joint action, applies.
Second, with respect to the  OSCE’s role it further needs to be clear how the
OSCE would be authorised to act. Normally the OSCE acts by consensus. Does
this mean that the OSCE could only take position upon the unanimous
agreement of all its member states? If the guarantor role could be performed by
any one of the three guarantors acting alone, would this mean that either Russia
or Ukraine could intervene contrary to the position of the OSCE (i.e. one or
more of its member states)?
Third, it is unclear what form of action the guarantors might take. For the
extensive guarantees set out in Article 36.I, II, III and IV one would expect
mechanisms of implementation to be set out clearly. The terms guarantee and
guarantor are very strong in the legal context of treaties. Looking at the content
of these guarantees one could imagine that there would have to be a high
representative, or a troika of three high representatives, entrusted with these
tasks. Would the high representative(s) be granted powers of decision?
Article 34 says that all disagreements shall be settled by exclusively peaceful
means. Could this mean intervention by the “peacekeeping forces under the
supervision of the OSCE” mentioned in Article 36.III? In which case what does
“under the supervision of the OSCE” mean? The word supervision is not precise
in legal terms. Does it mean a power of decision over the forces in question, or
just a role of observation and reporting to the OSCE?
Fourth, to avoid  conflictual types of intervention, it is necessary to devise
specific OSCE procedures for the Moldovan federation. The example mentioned
above of the judges in the Bosnian Constitutional Court appointed by the
                                                
9 Article IV of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee stated the following: “In the event of a breach of
the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to
consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure
observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove
possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole
aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.” Ehrlich, op. cit., p.
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President of the European Court of Human Rights provides only one of the
many possible ways to internalise the role of international organisations. It may
be interesting to consider the extent to which the OSCE might also provide for
specific mechanisms for the resolution of intra-state conflicts of its members.
10
Since the end of the 1980s, the OSCE has developed a number of procedures to
resolve disputes among its members. The Court of Conciliation and Arbitration,
established in 1992, binds those participating states who have agreed to it. An ad
hoc Conciliation Commission or an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal is established when
requested. The OSCE Permanent Council has also a role in mediating disputes.
These various alternatives show that it is possible in principle to devise
particular OSCE mechanisms for intra-state disputes in Moldova, which could
also give a prominent role to the two other guarantors to the conflict (Russia and
Ukraine).
Fifth, some questions arise from the very different nature of the four guarantee
chapters. For the political guarantees one is entering into what might usually be
the competence of a constitutional court. We have already discussed the role of
such a body above. One could indeed imagine a court of this type, as a
complement to the role of one or more high representatives. For the economic
and social policy guarantees indicated in Articles 36 II and IV it should be clear
how the guarantee system would work. For example it is understandable that
there should be ‘equal’ rights both to social benefits and human rights. The
constitutional court or guarantors could make rulings over complaints that this
was not being respected. Such rulings might be equivalent to rulings of the
European Court of Justice within the European Union, where it is accepted that
this court has supreme jurisdiction. If this type of model were to be adopted, this
should be made clear. If not, there would remain question whether the term
‘guarantee’ is being used in a valid way.
Some other provisions are implausible subjects of ‘guarantee’, as or example in
Article 36.I which states that “issues regarding the restoration and raising of the
economy shall be solved (…).”. We finally note that the role of the
peacekeeping forces in Article 36.III is subject of a separate document, which
we have not seen.
                                                
10 On the following, see Coppieters, Federalism and Conflict in the Caucasus, op. cit., pp. 51-
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[Unofficial translation of a draft agreement between the Republic of
Moldova and Transdniestria, with the Russian Federation, Ukraine and
OSCE as guarantors]
AGREEMENT
The Republic of Moldova and  Transdniestria, hereinafter referred to as the
Parties,
Striving rapidly and comprehensively to overcome by exclusively peaceful
and political means the consequences of the conflict which occurred in the
Transdniestrian region of the Republic of Moldova;
Recognising the responsibility for integrating the country, for securing civil
peace, trust, mutual understanding, and concord in society;
have agreed to the following:
Chapter 1. Fundamentals of the Constitutional System of the Republic of
Moldova
Article 1
The Republic of Moldova is a democratic, federal State, governed by the
rule of law, with a republican form of government, the policy of which is
oriented toward creating conditions ensuring a decent life and free development
for the individual.
Article 2
The human being, his rights and freedoms represent supreme values. The
recognition, observance, and protection of human rights and rights and freedoms
of the citizens are the obligation of the State.
Every citizen is guaranteed judicial protection of his/her rights and
freedoms.
The decisions and actions (or lack of action) of the central authorities, local
administration, public associations, and civil servants may be challenged in
court.
Each citizen is entitled, in accordance with the international treaties entered
into by the Republic of Moldova, to appeal to international human rights
institutions, in case all domestic legal remedies have been exhausted.
Article 3
National sovereignty resides with the people of the Republic of Moldova,
who are the only source of State power.CONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR MOLDOVA AND TRANSDNIESTRIA THROUGH FEDERALISATION?
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The people shall exercise their power directly and through central and local
authorities.
The sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova applies on its entire territory.
The Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Moldova have supremacy
on the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova.
The Republic of Moldova guarantees the territorial integrity and
inalienability of its territory.
Article 4
State-territorial entities shall be established within the Republic of Moldova.
They shall be entitled to have their own constitution and legislation.
The state order of the Republic of Moldova is based on its state integrity,
unity of the system of State power, delimitation of competencies and powers
between the State authorities of the Republic of Moldova and the authorities of
the state-territorial entities of the Republic of Moldova.
In their interrelations with the central authorities of the Republic of
Moldova, the state-territorial entities of the Republic of Moldova shall enjoy
equal rights vis-à-vis each other.
Article 5
The citizenship of the Republic of Moldova is acquired or lost in accordance
with the law and is single and equal irrespective of the bases of its acquisition.
Each citizen of the Republic of Moldova shall enjoy on its territory all the
rights and freedoms and shall bear equal responsibilities as provided by the
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova.
Article 6
The unity of economic space, free movement of commodities, services, and
financial means, and the freedom of economic activity are guaranteed in the
Republic of Moldova.
Private, State, municipal, and other types of property shall be equally
recognised and protected in the Republic of Moldova.
Article 7
The legislative, executive, and judicial branches in the Republic of Moldova
are separate and interact in the exercise of their prerogatives in accordance with
the provisions of the Constitution.
The legislative, executive, and judicial bodies are independent.
Article 8
State power in the Republic of Moldova is exercised by the President of the
Republic of Moldova, the Parliament (Chamber of Representatives and ChamberBRUNO COPPIETERS AND MICHAEL EMERSON
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of Legislators), the Government of the Republic of Moldova, the courts of the
Republic of Moldova.
State power in the state-territorial entities of the Republic of Moldova is
exercised through organs of State power to be established by them.
Delimitation of competencies and powers between the bodies of State power
of the Republic of Moldova and the bodies of the state-territorial entities of the
Republic of Moldova shall be realised through the present Agreement, the
Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Moldova, other agreements on
delimitation of competencies and powers.
Article 9
Local self-government shall be recognised and guaranteed in the Republic of
Moldova. The local self-government is independent within the limits of its
competencies.
Article 10
Political diversity and a  multi-party system shall be recognised in the
Republic of Moldova.
Chapter 2. State Order
Article 11
The territorial  organization of the Republic of Moldova shall include the
state-territorial entities to be established, by which is meant constitutionally
bound internal self-government of a part of the State territory.
Article 12
The status of the state-territorial entities shall be determined by the present
Agreement, the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Moldova.
Their status may be modified by mutual consent of the Republic of Moldova
and the state-territorial entities in accordance with the Constitution.
Article 13
The borders of the state-territorial entities of the Republic of Moldova may
be changed by their consent and that of the Republic of Moldova.
Article 14
The national language on the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova is
Moldovan, and its writing is based on the Latin script.
The state-territorial entities have the right to establish their own official
languages. These shall be used in the bodies of State authority, localCONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR MOLDOVA AND TRANSDNIESTRIA THROUGH FEDERALISATION?
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administration, and institutions, along with the State language of the Republic of
Moldova.
The Republic of Moldova guarantees the right to all people living on its
territory to preserve their native language and to create conditions for its study
and development.
Article 15
The Republic of Moldova shall have the following competencies:
a.  Adoption and amendment of the Constitution and the laws of the Republic
of Moldova and control over their implementation;
b.  State order and the territory of the Republic of Moldova;
c.  Regulation and protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual and
citizen;  citizenship in the Republic of Moldova, regulation and protection
of the rights of national minorities;
d.  Establishing the legislative, executive, and judicial systems, the
procedures of their organisation and functioning; forming bodies of State
authority;
e.  State property and its management;
f.  Establishing the fundamentals of  policy and programs in the areas of
State, economic, ecological, social, cultural, and national development of
the Republic of Moldova;
g.  Establishing the legal bases for a unified market; financial, currency,
credit, customs control regulations, money issuance, foundations of a
price policy; economic agencies, including the National Bank;
h.  Republican budget, taxes and duties;
i.  Power supply systems, transport, railroads, information, and
communications;
j.  Foreign policy and international relations of the Republic of Moldova,
international treaties of the Republic of Moldova, matters of war and
peace;
k.  Foreign economic relations of the Republic of Moldova;
l.  Defence and security; defence industry; determination of procedures for
selling and buying arms, ammunition, military equipment, and other
military property; production of poisonous substances, drugs, and
regulations for their use;
m. Determining the status of and protecting State borders and the airspace of
the Republic of Moldova; the regime of frontier zones;
n.   Judicial system, law enforcement, criminal legislation, criminal
procedural legislation, and legislation on enforcing sentences; amnesty
and pardon; civil legislation, civil procedural legislation, and arbitration
procedural legislation; legal regulation of intellectual property;
o.  Legal collisions;BRUNO COPPIETERS AND MICHAEL EMERSON
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p.  Meteorological service, standards, models, metric system, time
measurement, geodesy and cartography, geographical names, official
statistical registration and accounting;
q.  State awards and honorary titles of the Republic of Moldova.
Article 16
The joint competencies of the Republic of Moldova and state-territorial
entities include:
a.  Ensuring that the constitutions and laws of the state-territorial entities
correspond to the present Agreement, the Constitution and the laws of the
Republic of Moldova;
b.  Protecting the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen;
protecting the rights of national minorities; ensuring legality and the rule
of law;
c.   Issues of property, use and management of land, earth, water, and other
natural resources;
d.  Delimitation of State property;
e.  Nature management; environmental protection and ecological safety;
protection of natural territories; historical and cultural monuments;
f.  General issues of instruction, education, science, culture, physical training
and sports;
g.  Coordinating health care issues; protection of family, motherhood,
fatherhood, and childhood; social security, including welfare;
h.  Implementing measures for managing catastrophes, natural disasters,
epidemics, and eradicating their consequences;
i.  Establishing common principles of taxation;
j.  Administrative, administrative procedural, labour, family, residence, land,
water, forest legislation, legislation on earth resources, legislation on
environmental protection;
k.  Staff of the judicial and law enforcement bodies, the Bar, Notary’s Office;
l.  Establishing common principles for the organisation of the system of
State authority and local self-government.
The provisions of this article shall apply to all the state-territorial entities
equally.
The implementation of joint competencies and the exclusive competencies
of the Republic of Moldova and the state-territorial entities as agreed by the
Parties and shall proceed on a step-by-step basis.
Article 17
Beyond the limits of competencies of the Republic of Moldova and its
powers in the areas of joint competency of the Republic of Moldova and theCONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR MOLDOVA AND TRANSDNIESTRIA THROUGH FEDERALISATION?
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state-territorial entities of the Republic of Moldova, the state-territorial entities
of the Republic of Moldova enjoy full State power.
Article 18
The establishment of internal customs borders, taxes, duties, or any other
impediments to the free movement of commodities, services, and financial
recourses is forbidden on the territory of the Republic of Moldova.
Limitations to the movement of commodities and services may be
introduced in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Moldova, if
necessary for security reasons, for ensuring the lives and well-being of people,
for safeguarding nature and cultural values.
Article 19
The monetary unit of the Republic of Moldova is the Lei. Money issuance
shall be executed solely by the National Bank of the Republic of Moldova.
Introduction or issuance of other currency is forbidden in the Republic of
Moldova.
Article 20
Constitutional laws shall be adopted concerning the competencies of the
Republic of Moldova having direct force on the entire territory of the Republic
of Moldova.
Laws of the Republic of Moldova shall be adopted, as well as laws and other
normative acts of the state-territorial entities of the Republic of Moldova
conforming with the former, shall be adopted, regulating the areas of joint
competencies of the Republic of Moldova and the state-territorial entities.
Beyond the competencies of the Republic of Moldova, and the joint
competencies of the Republic of Moldova and the state-territorial entities of the
Republic of Moldova, the state-territorial entities shall execute their own legal
set-up, including passing of laws and other normative legal acts.
The laws and other normative legal acts of the state-territorial entities of the
Republic of Moldova shall not contradict the laws of the Republic of Moldova.
In case of contradiction, the law of the Republic of Moldova shall prevail.
Article 21
The state-territorial entities shall determine the system of organs of State
authority independently in accordance with the fundamentals of the
constitutional system of the Republic of Moldova and the common principles of
organisation of the legislative and executive branches of State authority.
Organs of executive authority of the Republic of Moldova and organs of
executive authority of the state-territorial entities shall constitute one unified
Executive Branch system in the Republic of Moldova.BRUNO COPPIETERS AND MICHAEL EMERSON
16
Article 22
With a view to implementing their competencies, the organs of executive
authority of the Republic of Moldova may establish their territorial organs and
appoint relevant officials.
By common agreement with the organs of executive authority of the state-
territorial entities, the organs of executive authority of the Republic of Moldova
may delegate implementation of part of their competencies to them, if this does
not contradict the present Agreement, the Constitution and the laws of the
Republic of Moldova.
By common agreement with the organs of executive authority of the
Republic of Moldova, organs of executive authority of the state-territorial
entities may delegate implementation of part of their competencies to them.
The President of the Republic of Moldova and the Government shall ensure
the implementation of State authority competencies throughout the Republic of
Moldova, in accordance with the present Agreement and the Constitution of the
Republic of Moldova.
Chapter 3. The President of the Republic of Moldova
Article 23
The President of the Republic of Moldova is the Head of State.
In accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of
Moldova, the President shall determine the main directions of the domestic and
foreign policies of the State.
Article 24
The President of the Republic of Moldova shall be elected at the joint
session of both Chambers of the Parliament.
The President of the Republic of Moldova has all the rights and duties
stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and other
constitutional laws.
The President of the Republic of Moldova is entitled to suspend the effect of
acts of organs of executive authority of the Republic of Moldova and of the
state-territorial entities of the Republic of Moldova, in case they violate the
Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Moldova, international
commitments of the Republic of Moldova, or the rights and freedoms of
individuals and citizens, until the issue is settled by an appropriate court of law.
The President of the Republic of Moldova may utilise agreed procedures for
resolving disagreements between organs of State authority of the Republic of
Moldova and organs of State authority of the state-territorial entities, and also
between organs of State authority of the state-territorial entities. In the event of
non-achievement of an agreement resolution, he may transfer resolution of the
dispute for review by an appropriate court.CONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR MOLDOVA AND TRANSDNIESTRIA THROUGH FEDERALISATION?
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Article 25
The President of the Republic of Moldova may be removed from office by
the Parliament on the basis of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova.
A decision by the Parliament to remove the President from office requires a
two thirds vote by the members of the Parliament.
Chapter 4. The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova
Article 26
The Parliament of the Republic of Moldova consists of two chambers: the
Chamber of Representatives and the Chamber of Legislators. The Chamber of
Representatives consists of 71 members. Its members are elected in accordance
with the law, by voting based on universal, equal, direct, secret and freely
expressed suffrage. The state-territorial entities are guaranteed representation in
the Chamber of Legislators in proportion to the number of their voters.
The Chamber of Representatives consists of 30 members and represents the
chamber of territorial representation. The state-territorial entities are represented
in the Chamber by an equal number of votes.
The election of the Parliament, the organisation of its activity, and its
competencies are established by the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of
Moldova.
Article 27
The right to legislative initiative belongs to the President of the Republic of
Moldova, the members of the Parliament, the Government of the Republic of
Moldova, and the legislative authorities of the state-territorial entities of the
Republic of Moldova.
Draft laws are submitted in the Chamber of Legislators.
Article 28
The laws of the Republic of Moldova are passed by the Chamber of
Legislators on the basis of majority vote of the overall number of deputies of
this chamber, unless the Constitution provides otherwise.
The laws passed by the Chamber of Legislators shall be submitted to the
Chamber of Representatives within 14 days.
A law of the Republic of Moldova shall be considered as approved by the
Chamber of Representatives if more than half of the overall number of members
of this chamber voted for it or if the Chamber of Representatives fails to
consider it during the 14 days.  In case of disagreement by the Chamber of
Legislators with the decision of the Chamber of Representatives a law shall be
considered as passed if on a second ballot it receives not less than two-thirds
majority of votes of the total number of members of the Chamber of Legislators.BRUNO COPPIETERS AND MICHAEL EMERSON
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In case the President of the Republic of Moldova rejects a law within
fourteen days after its submission, the Parliament shall examine the law for a
second time in accordance with the set procedure. If, under the second
consideration, the law is passed in the previously adopted version, the President
of the Republic of Moldova shall promulgate the law.
Article 29
Constitutional laws are passed on matters envisaged by the present
Agreement and the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova. The Constitutional
law is considered as passed if it is approved by two-thirds of the overall number
of members of the Chamber of Legislators.
Chapter 5. The Government of the Republic of Moldova
Article 30
Executive authority of the Republic of Moldova is exercised by the
Government of the Republic of Moldova. The formation, organisation of
activities, and the powers of the Government are established by the Constitution
and laws of the Republic of Moldova.
Chapter 6. The Judicial Authority of the Republic of Moldova
Article 31
Justice in the Republic of Moldova shall be administered by courts of law
only.
The court system of the Republic of Moldova is established by the
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and its laws. Creation of extraordinary
courts is forbidden.
Chapter 7. Local Self-Government in the Republic of Moldova
Article 32
The local administration guarantees independent resolution of problems of
local interest by the people.
Local administration is carried out by the citizens through referenda,
elections, other forms of direct expression of will, as well as through electoral
and other organs of local administration.
Chapter 8. Guarantees and Transitional Provisions
Article 33
With a view to assuring guarantees for implementation and establishment ofCONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR MOLDOVA AND TRANSDNIESTRIA THROUGH FEDERALISATION?
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a mechanism to fulfil the provisions of this Agreement and other documents on
issues of the Transdniestrian settlement,
The Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria mutually guarantee full and
unconditional implementation of agreements governing their interrelations.
Article 34
The Parties undertake not to resort to force, or to threats of the use of force,
in their mutual relations.
The Parties confirm that any and all disagreements shall be settled by
exclusively peaceful means, through negotiations and consultations between the
Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria, with the assistance and mediation of
the guarantor-states and the OSCE Mission.
Article 35
The Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the OSCE are the guarantors of the
observance of provisions of the Agreement.
Article 36
The Parties agreed on applying the guarantees for fulfilling the provisions of
the Agreement in the following spheres:
I.  Political Guarantees
Mutual respect toward the positions of the Parties shall be ensured, as well
as the non-acceptance of unilateral measures directed against other Party which
could undermine its authority.
The Parties shall develop a  coordinated intra-State procedure for entering
into force of  international documents which affect the interests of
Transdniestria.
II.  Economic Guarantees
During the transition period, by mutual efforts of the Republic of Moldova
and Transdniestria:
-  issues regarding the restoration and  raising of the economy shall be solved,
as well as development of economic relations in such spheres as the fuel-
energy complex, transport, communications, etc.; investments projects and
creation of joint ventures shall be stimulated;
-  the sums and sources of the contributions to the joint state budget shall be
determined by mutual agreement;
-  the issue of a common currency shall be dealt with step-by-step, until the
introduction of which the current currency regulations are maintained;
-  the content of cooperation between banks shall be determined through mutual
agreement;BRUNO COPPIETERS AND MICHAEL EMERSON
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-  laws on the state property shall be harmonised, as well as the legislation on
privatisation and property rights registration;
-  the tax systems shall be harmonised, by establishing common principles of
taxation and by developing a unified legislation in this sphere;
-  the work for developing a common legal basis shall be organised.
III.  Military Guarantees
In order to support secure peace and stability, the Parties agree to the
presence during the transition period of peacekeeping forces under the
supervision of the OSCE.
The provision on the peacekeeping forces in Transdniestria is governed by a
separate document, which is signed simultaneously with the present Agreement.
In order to strengthen confidence, to complete the unification of the Army,
and implement military guarantees, the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria
jointly undertake during the transition period:
a.  To inform each other about planned military activities;
b.  To establish the institution of military observers of the Parties at the
organised military activities.
IV.  Social, Cultural, and Other Guarantees
In the Republic of Moldova there are common coordinated standards in the
fields of education, health care, culture, welfare, retirement benefits, levels of
social guarantees in labour, social security.
On the entire territory the population enjoys equal and unhindered access to
medical care, to general and specialised education; equal conditions shall be
created for the implementation of educational and cultural needs and necessities
of citizens.
All the authorities in  Transdniestria shall ensure the observance of
internationally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms, provisions
on the rights and freedoms contained in the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its Protocols. The
stipulations on these rights and freedoms have superior force over other laws.
Everyone in Transdniestria may appeal to international institutions to defend
his/her rights.
All representatives of international organisations shall have access to
Transdniestria in order to provide international assistance. All inhabitants of
Transdniestria shall also have unhindered and direct access to the staff members
of such organisations.
The Parties acknowledge that all the citizens have the right to return to their
homes in  Transdniestria and Moldova. The relevant authorities shall take all
measures to facilitate the safe return of such persons. The Parties shall take allCONFLICT RESOLUTION FOR MOLDOVA AND TRANSDNIESTRIA THROUGH FEDERALISATION?
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measures to accommodate them. All these persons are entitled to their property
and personal belongings.
Through search mechanisms of the Committee on Missing Persons, the
Parties shall cooperate and submit information to the families of all the persons,
whose fate is unknown.
The Parties appeal to the international community with the request to
provide humanitarian aid primarily for refugees and displaced persons returning
to their abandoned homes.
Article 37
Amendments shall be introduced to the Constitution of the Republic of
Moldova to take account of the provisions of the signed documents on the
settlement of relations between the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria.
The constitution and legislation of the subjects of the Republic of Moldova
shall conform to the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and the present
Agreement.
Article 38
The institutions currently functioning in Transdniestria shall be retained until
their replacement by bodies established in accordance with the Constitution of
the Republic of Moldova and the present Agreement.
All the laws, decisions, and other acts valid in Transdniestria at the moment
of this Agreement entering into force, remain in effect if and until they are
replaced by laws and decisions adopted by a competent body.
Article 39
To settle disputes and conflict situations during the transition period, the
Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria agreed to establish joint commissions
on the basis of mutual trust.
In the year _____, elections in the two-chamber Parliament of the Republic
of Moldova shall be held, and the new organs of authority of the Republic of
Moldova and the state-territorial entities shall be established.
Article 40
From the moment of signature of this Agreement the Parties shall ensure:
-  development of mechanisms for establishing a unified budget, banking/credit
systems, macroeconomic policy;
-  use by Transdniestria of its own monetary unit along with the Moldovan Lei,
for cashless payments;
-  citizen’s rights and freedoms;
-  implementation of measures to reduce the armed forces of the Parties to their
minimal possible level;BRUNO COPPIETERS AND MICHAEL EMERSON
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-  implementation of measures to combat crime;
-  the resolution of other issues.
Article 41
Based on agreements to be reached in the transition period, as well as on
documents determining the status of Transdniestria, the Parties agreed with the
necessity of preparing and submitting the appropriate legislative initiatives on
adding to and amending legislation.
To implement the measures for step-by-step settlement set out in this
Agreement, the Parties shall continue to hold regular meetings, shall ensure the
uninterrupted work of the commissions on socio-economic development and on
coordination and support of the negotiating process.
The Parties may also, if necessary, establish by mutual consent joint or
conforming commissions, expert groups, other working bodies for the drafting
and implementation of various agreements.
Each Party has the right to pass legal acts, facilitating the implementation of
competencies and obligations contained in the present Agreement, on condition
that such acts shall not modify, limit, or undermine the obligations set forth in
this Agreement.
Article 42
The present Agreement has supreme judicial force, direct effect and it
applies on the entire territory of the Republic of Moldova. Laws and other legal
acts adopted in the Republic of Moldova may not violate the present Agreement.
The universally recognised principles and norms of international law are a
constituent part of the legal system of the Republic of Moldova.
This Agreement enters into force from the day of its signature.
For the Republic of Moldova  For Transdniestria
From the guarantor states:
For the Russian Federation  For Ukraine
For the OSCE
___________________________
“       “______ 2002